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order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct.
313 (1990) (finding a narrowing construction for a component of the
Mississippi "vileness" factor to be unconstitutionally vague). See case
summary of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991).
Virginia allows a death sentence if the murder was "outrageously
orwantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.2. The Virginia statute precisely mirrors the words found to be
constitutionally deficient (as applied) in Godfrey. Thus, under current
law, Virginia may apply its "vileness" factor only if the courts monitor
its use and provide narrowing constructions of the vague language.
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356.
While Virginia does not require that narrowing constructions be
provided for the sentencing jury, Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,
257 S.E.2d 784 (1979), the Virginia Supreme Court has defined two of
the three factors in its vileness predicate. The court has defined
"depravity of mind" as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychic
debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of legal malice and
premeditation." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d
135, 148-49 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). The court defined
"aggravated battery" as "a battery which is qualitatively and quantita-
tively more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act
of murder." Id. In a recent case, Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (1991),
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the Virginia narrowing
constructions announced in Smith. See case summary of Jones, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
Bunch relied on Godfi'ey and Maynard in his attack on the
Virginia vileness factor. Bunch asserted both that the Virginia vileness
factor was unconstitutionally vague and that the trial court erred in
refusing to provide a limiting instruction. The Virginia Supreme Court
did not explicitly monitor Bunch's conviction to discern whether its
narrowing constructions of the "vileness" factor had been satisfied. In
the absence of the application of a narrowing construction, Bunch's
position is correct as a matter of law. See Lago, Litigating the
"Vileness" Factor in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1,
p. 24 (1991); Falkner, The Constitutional Deficiencies of Virginia's
"Vileness" Aggravating Factor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No.
2, p. 19 (1989).
The Fourth Circuit summarily rejected Bunch's attacks. Bunch,
949 F.2d at 1367. The court cited Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092,1105
(4th Cir. 1990), in support of its holding. The Fourth Circuit rejected a
Godfrey challenge to the Virginia statute in Clozza, also in a conclusory
fashion. Id. The Bunch court attempts to minimize this important issue
by addressing it with only one unsupported sentence. Bunch, 949 F.2d at
1367.
Although the Fourth Circuit continues to ignore the constitutional
attacks on the Virginia "vileness" factor, attorneys should not. The
Godfrey, Maynard and Shell issues can be raised and preserved in the
defendant's motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty, in a
motion for a bill of particulars requiring the Commonwealth to disclose
any aggravating factor and any narrowing construction upon which it
intends to rely, and by appropriate objections at the penalty trial when the
jury is instructed.
Summary and Analysis by:
G. Douglas Kilday
JONES v. MURRAY
947 F.2d 1106 (1991)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In 1984, Willie Leroy Jones was tried in York County, Virginia
for the 1983 capital murders of Myra and Graham Adkins. Evidence at
trial showed that both victims had been shot in the head at close range by
Jones. The medical examiner testified that only Mr. Adkins died quickly.
Mrs. Adkins' gunshot wound, according to the medical examiner, would
have allowed her to live for several hours. Both Mr. and Mrs Adkins had
been covered with fire accelerant and Mrs. Adkins, who was still alive,
had been bound, gagged and set on fire.
Jones was examined, prior to his trial, by three state doctors
pursuant to a court order to determine Jones' competency to stand trial.
Two of the doctors also examined Jones with specific attention to mitigat-
ing mental factors. The examining doctors found Jones competent to stand
trial; the doctors also found no evidence of mental mitigating factors.
Immediately before Jones' trial began, the Commonwealth's
Attorney offered two consecutive life terms with additional time for the
arson charge in exchange forJones' pleading guilty to capital murder and
arson. Jones' attorney told him of the offer and reviewed the strengths
and weaknesses of the Commonwealth's case as well as the evidence
against Jones. Counsel told Jones that it was his opinion that there was
a seventy percent chance of conviction and a forty to fifty percent chance
of Jones receiving the death penalty. Jones' attorney made no recom-
mendation to his client and completely left the decision of whether or not
to accept the plea bargain to Jones. Jones, stating that he was innocent,
rejected the Commonwealth's offer. Jones was found guilty of capital
murder and sentenced to death.
After Jones' direct appeals and state habeas claims were ex-
hausted, he petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The
District Court denied relief. Jones appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
claiming inter alia that he had not received effective assistance of
counsel and that the jury instructions at the penalty stage of his trial
resulted in unconstitutional application of the aggravating factor used to
support his death sentence.
Jones claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on two
allegations: Jones argued that his attorney neither recommended that he
accept the Commonwealth's plea bargain, nor attempted to persuade him
to accept the plea bargain, and that his counsel failed to investigate
mitigating evidence that could have been used during the penalty phase
of his trial.
Jones also contended that the jury instructions that dealt with the
"vileness" aggravating factorgivenduringthesentencingphaseofhis trial were
unconstitutional. He argued that because the three "vileness" factor compo-
nents ("torture, depravity ofmind oraggravatedbatteryto thevictim" Va. Code
Ann. §19-2-264.2(C)) were phrased disjunctively on the jury forms and in the
instructions, there was "no assurance that his sentencing jury reached a
unanimous decision as to which component of vileness was presented by his
crimes." 947 F.2d 1106, 1116 (4th Cir., 1991).
Jones also argued that the Virginia vileness aggravating factor
was unconstitutionally vague in that a constitutionally sufficient narrow-
ing construction of it had not been applied pursuant to Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and its progeny.
Jones assigned numerous other errors. Some of these the court
treated conclusively. Others did not involve death penalty law or are
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unlikely to arise often because they revolved around facts peculiar to this
case. These issues, which will not be discussed in this summary, include:
various ineffective assistance of counsel claims, whether a defendant's
not denying guilt upon taking the witness stand amounts to a confession,
and whether failure to instruct the jury to consider mitigating circum-
stances is unconstitutional.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of relief.
Using the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), the court held that Jones' trial attorney was not ineffective for
failing to recommend the plea bargain or attempting to persuade Jones to
accept it. Jones' counsel was also not ineffective, the court held, for not
obtaining a psychiatric review independent of the State's investigation of
Jones' possible mitigating mental state.
The court noted that a federal court's inquiry into whether or not
an aggravating factor has been properly considered and found should not
be restricted to jury instructions given at trial. Therefore, assuming
arguendo that Jones was correct in his claim that the disjunctive instruc-
tion could have resulted in a less than unanimous finding, the court held
that the Virginia Supreme Court, in its automatic review of Jones'
sentence, made the appropriate finding of an aggravating factor thus
authorizing the imposition of the death penalty.
Further, to Jones' contention that the Virginia Supreme Court
failed to adopt any limiting construction of the vileness aggravating
factor, the Fourth Circuit approved the Virginia Supreme Court's appli-
cation of its narrowing construction as constitutionally sufficient.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The court analyzed Jones' ineffective assistance ofcounselclaims
by using the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington: "the defen-
dant must show that counsel's performance was deficient [and] ... that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 466 U.S. at 687.
The court used the American BarAssociation Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice to answer Jones' claim that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel because his attorney did not persuade him to accept the
Commonwealth's plea bargain. The ABA Standards were, theJones court
noted, "recognized by the Supreme Court as 'guides to determining what
is reasonable."' 947 F.2d at 1110 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
ABA Standard 14-3.2(a) provides that "defense counsel should
conclude a plea agreement only with the consent of the defendant" and
that the decision should be left entirely to the defendant. Standard 14-
3.2(b) says that defense counsel should advise their client of alternatives
and of important considerations respecting whetherornot to accept aplea
bargain. Jones' attorney advised Jones of the Commonwealth's offer.
Counsel advised Jones of the available alternative of going to trial and
gave Jones his opinion as to the probable outcomes of the guilt and
penalty phases of his impending trial. Counsel also discussed the
strengths and weaknesses of the Commonwealth's case against Jones.
Thus, the court concluded, the attorney's performance did not violate
professional standards.
When a defense attorney looks at the evidence againsther client and
assesses that the evidence is overwhelming, counsel may attempt, al-
though it is not constitutionally required, to persuade her client to accept
the Commonwealth's offer without violating ABA Standard 14-3.2(a).
While cautioning that it does not wish to make a binding rule in
such cases, the Fourth Circuit cited with approval one such instance in
which the court wrote that an attorney may have had a duty to persuade
his client to plead guilty: United States v. Jones, 392 F. 2d 567 (4th Cir.,
1968). Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not
involved in United States v. Jones, a footnote at the end of the opinion
stated that "this is the kind of case which should never have been tried."
Id. at 569, n.3. The defendants in United States v. Jones were convicted
of escaping from prison and appealed their conviction. The court in that
case stated that "since people are either in or out of prison ... it is difficult
for a United States Attorney to fail to secure a valid conviction in a
prosecution for escape.... [In such a case] nothing is gained for the
defendant by pleading not guilty and other opportunities... may be lost
by the entry of such a plea." Id., cited in Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d at
1111, n.3. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Jones went on to note
that an attorney's duties to his client and to the courts and public do not
conflict in such a case; in fact, the court noted that "both [duties] dictate
that the client be advised strongly to plead guilty." 392 F. 2d at 569, n.3
(emphasis added).
As to Jones' sixth amendment claim based on the fact that his
counsel did not solicit additional psychiatric exams independent of those
conducted by the State, the court again used the Strickland standard and
held that counsel's reliance on the state psychiatrists' exams was not
unreasonable.
However, Jones' counsel could have seen that the exams were
incomplete. The opinion suggests strongly that the state-appointed
psychologists considered only statutory mitigating factors: the Fourth
Circuit wrote that "the psychologists testified that they were familiar
with Virginia's statutory provisions regarding mitigating mental condi-
tions. They ultimately concluded that there was no evidence of any such
mitigating mental factors." 947 F.2d at 1112 (emphasis added). From
the court's language, one may infer that no examination was done as to
non-statutory mitigating factors.
The Fourth Circuit even failed to describe accurately the statutory
mitigating factors. While the Code of Virginia describes mental mitigat-
ing factors as "at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired," § 19.2-264.4 (emphasis added), the Fourth Circuit described
them as "at the relevant time, did not have the capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law." 947 F.2d at 1112 (emphasis added).
If the record shows that only statutory mitigating factors were
considered in the psychiatric examinations, Jones' claim that state fact
finding was not entitled to deference at federal habeas proceedings was
correct. Again, from the language, it appears that the state psychologists
investigated only statutory mitigating circumstances. Because the state
court found that "there is no evidence that, at the time Jones committed
the murders, any mitigating mental circumstances existed," Id. at 1112
(emphasis added), then the state court's factual determinations respect-
ing the existence of mental mitigating factors and ineffective assistance
of counsel were not supported by the record as a whole. For, again, Jones'
attorney could have determined that the examinations were not, by
themselves, adequate as to mitigating circumstances for the purposes of
sentencing. Thus, Jones arguably should have been entitled to an
evidentiary hearing at the federal level on this component of his ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim.
B. Vileness Aggravating Factor
To Jones' claim that the disjunctive phrasing of Virginia's
vileness factor components in the jury instructions and forms did not
guarantee jury unanimity, the court responded that a jury is not
necessary for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty. The
court relied on Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), for the
proposition that "a federal court's inquiry should not be confined to the
jury instructions, but should 'examine the entire course of the state
court proceedings against the defendant in order to determine whether,
at some point in the process, the requisite finding as to defendant's
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culpability has been made."' Jones, 947 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Cabana,
474 U.S. at 387).
The requisite (or specific) finding in the instant case, the court
wrote, is found in Va. Code Ann. §17-1 10.1(C)(2): "whether the sen-
tence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Because
the Virginia Supreme Court found no disproportionality in its automatic
review ofJones' sentence, the Fourth Circuit held, based on Cabana, that
this review met the specific finding and proper application of an aggra-
vating factor authorizing the imposition of capital punishment.
However, the Cabana ruling that a requisite finding could be
made by an appellate court (if not made by a jury) was limited to the
specific finding of the defendant's degree of culpability. In Cabana, the
Supreme Court held that "the factual determination of whether the
defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill" could be specifi-
cally made by an appellate court. 474 U.S. at 390. A specific finding as
to the defendant's degree of culpability was required by Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), in which the Court held that, without the
requisite finding of culpability, imposition of the death penalty would be
disproportionate. Cabana did not authorize the curing of constitutional
infirmities in aggravating circumstances via an appellate court's general
finding of proportionality.
In Jones, the Fourth Circuit finally acknowledged that the states
must provide a narrowing construction for their aggravating factors
pursuant to Godfiey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). In Godfrey, the
United States Supreme Court held that Georgia's application of its
vileness aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague because "there
is nothing in these few words, standing alone that implied any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence."
Id. at 429. The constitutionality of the application of the vileness
aggravating factor was again tested in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356 (1988). The Court in Maynard held that state supreme courts must
monitor the use of any vague aggravating factors that the states use in
sentencing a defendant to death.
The court approved Virginia's application to the facts of Jones'
case the limiting constructions of "aggravated battery" - "a battery
which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the mini-
mum necessary to accomplish an act of murder," Smith v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978)- and "depravity
of mind" - "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement
surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and
premeditation." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. at 478,248 S.E.2d at
149.
It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has not
yet approved Virginia's narrowing construction of its statutory vileness
factor. In Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990), however, the Court
held that the limiting construction of Mississippi's vileness factor was
not constitutionally sufficient. See also case summary of Shell v. Missis-
sippi, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1991). Mississippi's
limiting construction is similar to Virginia's.
Since the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality
of Virginia's narrowing construction, defense counsel should file a
motion for a bill of particulars asking the Commonwealth to state upon
which of the three vileness factor components the prosecution will rely
in seeking the death penalty. In addition, defense counsel should request,
pre-trial, disclosure of all "narrowing constructions" that the Common-
wealth intends to use at the sentencing phase. Virginia's construction of
"depravity of mind," defense counsel should note, is particularly suspect
after Shell v. Mississippi. Defense counsel will, through pre-trial
litigation, preserve constitutional challenges to the Commonwealth's
narrowing construction of its vileness factor at trial. In order to insure
absolutely the preservation of this issue, objection should also be made
at the penalty trial to the jury verdict form (see Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.4 (D)) and the model penalty trial jury instruction (see Va. Model
Jury Instruction No. 34.120).
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles
ROGERS v. COMMONWEALTH
242 Va. 307,410 S.E.2d 621 (1991)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
The Circuit Court of Allegheny County, Virginia convicted Rocky
Dale Rogers of three felonies (robbery, burglary and rape) and capital
murder in November 1990. The capital murder conviction was based on
"the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of the victim while in the
commission of robbery when armed with a deadly weapon, or while in the
commission of, or subsequent to, rape" pursuant to Virginia Code Section
18.2-31 (4)(5).
The victim, a 74-year-old-widow, was in her home in Covington
when Rogers forced his way inside. According to the defendant's own
statement and the Commonwealth's theory, at least one other individual,
Troy Malcolm, accompanied the defendant. They entered the house
planning to rob the woman. Ultimately, she was severely beaten about the
head, face and neck with fists and a glass candlestick holder, stripped nude
and raped. At some point she was stabbed a number of times in the chest
and back, causing wounds which killed her.
The defendant changed his story during the course of several
interrogations, admitted rape, but throughout maintained that he did not
stab the victim. Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307,316,410 S.E.2d
621, 626 (1991). At trial, the Commonwealth's position was that the
defendant was "'the last man in the house,' tacitly conceding that at least
one other person was present at some time" during the criminal enter-
prise. Rogers, 242 Va. at 318, 410 S.E.2d at 628. The detective who
interrogated Rogers also represented to him that Malcolm had acknowl-
edged being in the house. Rogers, 242 Va. at 316,410 S.E.2d at 626. The
Commonwealth presented no forensic evidence linking Rogers to the
killing.
HOLDING
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the noncapital convictions,
which the defendant did not appeal. On appeal of the capital murder
conviction, however, the court chose to address the single issue of
"whether the evidence [was] legally sufficient to establish that the
defendant was the actual perpetrator of the crime," and reversed. Rogers,
242 Va. at 310, 410 S.E.2d at 623.
The court held that, as to capital murder, the prosecution failed to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence in that
the Commonwealth failed to exclude Malcolm as the perpetrator of the
killing. In other words, "the Commonwealth's evidence failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Rogers was the so-called
'triggerman' [in] thathe wielded the knife." Rogers, 242 Va. at 319, 621
S.E.2d at 628. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case for trial on an offense no greater than murder in the first degree.
